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BOOK REVIEWS
gram of religious instruction are not an
answer to the criticism of a secularistic
education. They are however efforts to
minimize its disadvantages and therefore, in
the reviewer's opinion, merit our support.
On the question of centralization of ed-
ucational effort and authority, there is an
analysis of the arguments for and against
centralization 39 and a review of the systems
that obtain in various countries. 40 The
principle of subsidiarity is applicable here.
In educational policy, "subsidiarity means
that a centralized arm of government ought
not to undertake the work of education if
that work can be done effectively by a local
unit." 41
In this carefully documented volume, the
author expounds basic philosophical prin-
ciples and methodically applies them to
practices here and abroad in the tremen-
dously important field of education. He has
done it well. This book is a worthwhile
addition to the library not only of a Catho-
lic lawyer but of anyone seriously interested
in educational policy.
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, by Thomas E. Davitt, S.J.
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1959. Pp. 370. $9.00
Reviewed by
JOHN C. H. Wu*
This book is an introductory book on
jurisprudence, which the author identifies
with the philosophy of law. The book is
divided into four parts. The first part deals
with "man-made law," the second with
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teach-
ers and our Country." Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc.2d
659, 660, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The Engel case is a learned and exhaustive opin-
ion by Meyer, J., which holds that the noncom-
pulsory recital of this prayer by public school
children pursuant to a Board of Education resolu-
tion, is not violative of the Federal or State Con-
stitution. At this writing an appeal is pending in
the Appellate Division. See discussion of this case
in 6 CATHOLIC LAWYER 164 (Spring 1960).
39 DUBAY 162-64.
40 Id. at 165-68.
*Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law.
"man-discovered law," the third with "in-
tegration of man-made law," and the fourth
with "background of law." The first part
has six chapters, treating of the nature, end,
content, source, sanction and obligation of
man-made law. The second part has five
chapters, treating first of references, in
judicial decisions and legislative enact-
ments, to a law not man-made, then of
the nature of man-discovered law, its con-
tent, source and end, its sanction and obli-
gation, and finally its relation to man-made
law. The third part has eight chapters,
treating first of principles and patterns of
41 Id. at 163. President Eisenhower's statement to
the 1955 White House Conference on Education
said that education "should be under the control
of the family apd the locality. It should not be
controlled by a central authority." Ibid.
integration, then of constitutions, crimes,
torts, property, contracts and equity. The
fourth part has two chapters, treating of
law as an instrument of government, and
political union and the common good.
It is clear that the book has a wide
coverage. The only regrettable omission
is the law of domestic relations, especially
as this particular topic is announced along
with the others on page 154.
It is a work of solid scholarship and
clear thinking. The chapters on "man-dis-
covered law" constitute the most original
part of the book. The author is bold enough
to drop the phrase "natural law" and sub-
stitute for it the phrase "man-discovered
law." Many of us may not agree with him
on the necessity or desirability of doing
this. This reviewer, for one, does not. But
the author has his reasons which are far
from flippant. Let me quote:
The phrase "natural law" has had a check-
ered history. It is open to many diverse,
contradictory and misleading interpreta-
tions, some of which we have seen. Used
even as synonymous with man-discovered
law as here explained, it does not express the
meaning it is intended to convey: a natu-
rally promulgated law discoverable in its
promulgation.'
He is aware that some words, such as
"right" and "state" have to be retained
even though they are inexact and somewhat
unsatisfactory, because "their use has be-
come so common that any attempt to root
them out of men's minds would be futile."
But he thinks that the phrase "natural law"
does not belong to this class. "In fact, a
great part of the legal world despises it
and looks upon it as meaningless. Even
those who do use it must have recourse to
1 DAVIrT, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 149 (1959).
6 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1960
other expressions to give it meaning - if
they do not merely mouth the phrase as a
magic formula." Then comes the challeng-
ing question:
Would it not therefor6 be better to expend
our efforts trying to find better ways of ex-
pressing what man-discovered law is than
to retain the phrase "natural law" tena-
ciously and then squander our time jousting
with the shadowy apparitions which have
been conjured up by our use of it?2
After quoting a long passage from Judge
Jerome Frank, who also complained of "the
misleading connotations and embarrassing
historical associations of the words 'Natu-
ral Law,' " the author goes on to say:
The thing discussed is more important than
the words used to discuss it. If an idea
recurs in legal thinking as persistently as
does "natural law" and if it is developed in
so many diversified ways and has so many
different meanings, only one conclusion can
be drawn: there is some definite datum that
men are trying to explain and its explana-
tion is intricate and complex. 3
This definite datum the author identifies
with the "demands expressed by a man's
nature."'4 He thinks that this expression
"brings out more accurately than 'natural
law' what it is that is being referred to: a
law naturally promulgated through men's
dynamic nature." '5
I do not think that it is so important to
drop the term "natural law" and adopt
instead "man-discovered law" or "demands
expressed by a man's nature." It is merely
a question of semantics. The real difficulty
lies in securing an agreement among jurists
of different philosophies and ideologies as
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at 150.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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to what demands expressed by human na-
ture are truly fundamental and ontologi-
cally rooted. The author is right in saying
that the word "natural" refers to natural
promulgation. "What is called natural law
is actually a natural promulgation of eter-
nal law." 6 So far I agree. But I think that
there is another connotation to the word
"natural"; it refers to the ontological give-
ness, which the author rightly stresses in
his exposition of the nature of "man-dis-
covered law."
But apart from this question of terminol-
ogy, there is no question that the author's
presentation has the merit of translating the
essentials of what John Wild calls the "au-
thentic" tradition of natural law into the
language of the twentieth century. The
chapter on the content, source and end of
"man-discovered law" is particularly valu-
able. "A man's natural drives," the author
says, "are indicative of the demands of
man-discovered law."7 These drives belong
to various levels of human existence. Let
me quote one passage in order to illustrate
how skillfully the author renders Thomism
into modem language:
Just as the rosebush strives to stay alive by
seeking water through its roots and sun-
shine through its leaves, in like manner
every man has an elementary drive to pre-
serve himself in existence. Since the race of
men must continue if there are to be men,
every man, like all other animals, has a drive
to unite sexually to keep the race in exis-
tence. And, since men need other men, each
has a drive to live in community with others.
Finally, since men are uniquely endowed
with the powers of knowing and willing,
they have a drive to use these powers in
decision-making existence. These drives re-
6 Id. at 117.
7 Id. at 121.
garding the various levels of human exis-
tence, then, take their meaning from men's
master drive for their highest development. s
After dealing adequately with the drives
regarding the lower levels, the author comes
to the Creator, who is at once the source
and the end of natural law. He maintains
that to speak of a "fundamental," "natu-
ral," or "higher" law without relating it
to the Creator-lawmaker would be "to
make of it a blind, irrational force that is
is no way a law." 9 He further asserts:
If there is a relation between the Supreme
Being and law, between the Creator and
certain fundamental claims, it must be based
on the fact that he has created men whose
natures express demands that are part of
a law.' 0
That this insight, whatever may be its
actual origin in the author's mind, is logi-
cally independent of the Christian revela-
tion, may be illustrated by a stanza from
an ancient Chinese poem, which both Con-
fucius and Mencius warmly commended:
Heaven in giving birth to the multitudes of
people,
To every faculty and relationship annexed
its law:
The people possess this normal nature,
And they consequently love its normal na-
ture."
The Confucians call this Heaven-made law,
which is affixed to human nature, by the
name of Tao. This, I spbmit, corresponds
to what the author calls "man-discovered
law."
Of all parts of the book the first part,
dealing with "man-made law," is the least
8 Id. at 120.
9 Id. at 128.
10 Id. at 132.
11 See Sih, The Natural Law Philosophy of Men-
cius, 31 THE NEw SCHOLASTICISM 317, 320 (1957).
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satisfactory. I have serious reservations on
what the author says about promulgation:
Law, then, described in its function as a
guide for the people, is the sum of rules
promulgated .... Defined, however, as it is
in itself, law is a directive judgment of those
with authority ordering means necessary for
the common good. 12
It seems that here the author has intro-
duced a gratuitous and confusing distinc-
tion between the other essential elements
of the notion of law and promulgation, a
distinction which is absent in St. Thomas'
definition: "An ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care
of the community, and promulgated. '"13
The very notion of law supposes both the
law-making authority and law-obeying sub-
ject. It must in some way be communicated
to the latter before it can be called "law."
What only exists in the mind of the author-
ity may indeed be a "plan," but not "law."
The author seems to be under the influence
of John Austin and Holland on this point.
I have dealt with this point at some length
in my work on Jurisprudence' 4 to which I
wish to refer the reader.
Another point on which I cannot agree
with the author is with regard to his state-
ment that it is "questionable whether the
phrase 'international law' has any valid legal
meaning beyond that of contractual agree-
ment." He says further, "if law presupposes
12 DAVITT, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 15 (1959).
13 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 90, art. 4.
14 WU, CASES ON JURISPRUDENCE 224-40 (1958).
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governmental authority, international law
must be enacted by an international gov-
ernment." 15 Now, to my mind, law pre-
supposes authority, but not governmental
authority. That international law has an in-
dependent existence even though it is, in
many cases, administered by national courts,
I have tried to show in my article on "The
Common-Law Approach to International
Law. ' 16 I cannot enter upon the question
here.
In addition, the chapter on the "sanction
of man-made law" seems to me excellent.
The author's treatment of "intrinsic sanc-
tion" is a valuable contribution in this field.
Most lawyers are accustomed to think of
sanction in terms of "extrinsic sanction."
The author calls attention to some aspect
of it here which must appear to many as
new, but which is nevertheless real.
The third part furnishes interesting and
profitable reading. Here the author's legal
erudition is clearly shown. He has his def-
inite views on all the fundamental institu-
tions of the law. Whether you agree with
him or not, he talks as a full-fledged law-
yer. The chapter on equity 'is particularly
happy. He thinks of equity as a "bridge
between philosophical and legal thinking."
1 7
Further "equity is standing confirmation
that man-discovered law is a prior and
more fundamental law. .. .
15 DAVITT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 66.
16 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER 295-303 (Autumn 1959).
17 DAvrIr, op. cit. supra note 12, at 308.
18 Ibid.
